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NOTES
TEXAS ELECTIVE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION:
A MODEL OF INNOVATION?
ABSTRACT
Workers' Compensation is often described as a bargain between
employers and employees. Employees give up the right to sue their
employers in negligence for workplace injuries, and, in return, employers
agree to pay predictable, statutorily mandated benefits to injured
employees. Over time, this “bargain” became compulsory in every state
but one. Texas is the only state in which employers and employees can
decide whether or not to enter the workers' compensation bargain. This
elective system has some fairly serious problems, and many have
advocated its abandonment. This Note analyzes the system's history,
compares the system to conventional compulsory systems, analyzes some
of its weaknesses, and concludes that with some modifications, the system
could be a useful model for other states interested in fostering innovation
and cost reduction in their own occupational injury systems. This
conclusion is based on the experience of a small but significant number of
Texas employers that opt out of the workers' compensation system and yet
provide, at a lower cost, substantially the same benefits to injured
employees as would be available under workers' compensation. The
existence of this parallel occupational injury system directly benefits those
employers that are able to construct cost-saving alternative benefit
programs. In addition, it has the potential to indirectly benefit even those
employers that participate in the workers' compensation system as cost
saving techniques innovated in the less regulated occupational injury
benefits market trickle into the more highly-regulated workers'
compensation market.
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INTRODUCTION
Texas is the only state that has an elective workers’ compensation
system.1 The system has some fairly serious problems, and many have
advocated its abandonment.2 This Note analyzes the system’s history,
compares the system to the conventional compulsory systems that every
other state has, analyzes some of the system’s weaknesses, and concludes
that with some modifications, the system could be a useful model for other
states interested in fostering innovation and cost reduction in their own
occupational injury systems. This conclusion is based on the experience of
a small but significant number of Texas employers that opt out of the
workers’ compensation system, and yet provide, at a lower cost,
substantially the same benefits to injured employees as would be available
under workers’ compensation.3 The existence of this parallel benefit
program presently benefits individual employers who can construct such
programs and benefit from their cost savings. It also has the potential to
benefit even those employers that participate in the workers’
compensation system, as cost saving techniques innovated in the less
regulated occupational injury benefits market trickle into the more highly
regulated workers’ compensation market.4
This Note is organized into five parts. Part I outlines the historical
development of a no fault workers’ compensation system in this country
that came to replace common law employer's liability actions as the
principal recourse for injured employees.5 Part I also discusses how
workers’ compensation became compulsory in every state in the union
except for Texas.6 Part II explains Texas's unique workers’ compensation
system and includes a discussion of the different options Texas employers
have for providing benefits to injured workers. Part II also chronicles a
history of different types of abuses by non-subscribing employers and the
Texas legislature's response to each type of abuse. Part II additionally
discusses how non-subscribing employers are using the Federal
Arbitration Act to preempt a Texas statute that forbids employers from
1

See infra note 97 and accompanying text (comparing Texas’s system to other
states).
2
See discussion infra Part II.C (describing the impact of waiver and arbitration
provisions).
3
See infra Part II (discussing Texas’s workers’ compensation system).
4
See discussion infra Part III (detailing workers’ compensation risk financing).
5
See infra Part I.C.i-iii (chronicling the shift to a workers’ compensation system).
6
See infra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing Texas’s workers’
compensation system and its comparison to other states).
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obtaining pre-injury claim waivers from their employees. Part III discusses
the basic risk financing methods used in workers’ compensation. Part IV
explains the two basic ways employers can save money by opting out of
the workers’ compensation system, namely, assuming the risk of
negligence claims and heading off negligence claims by providing an
alternative benefit plan. Part V discusses the benefits of elective workers’
compensation. It argues that an elective system of workers’ compensation
offers employers an opportunity to simultaneously save money and create
new ways to provide benefits comparable to those of the workers’
compensation system. The conclusion begins by noting that in order to
expand Texas-style elective workers’ compensation to other states,
Congress must first amend the Federal Arbitration Act to prevent its
preemption of state anti-waiver statutes in the employment contract
context.7 It proceeds to list some other more minor improvements that the
system would require before any other states would consider adopting an
elective system. Ultimately this Note concludes that with these
modifications, and with Congressional action on the Federal Arbitration
Act, elective workers’ compensation would provide states and employers a
competitive advantage.
I. HISTORY OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Negligence Liability System
Prior to the advent of modern workers’ compensation statutes,
employees injured on the job had no guaranteed benefits.8 An injured
employee's only recourse after an injury was to sue his employer under
common law negligence.9 Under the negligence regime, employers were
required to exercise due care, which included hiring suitable and sufficient
coworkers, establishing and enforcing proper rules of conduct, providing a
safe workplace and safe equipment, and providing warnings and suitable
instructions in dangerous working conditions.10 An injured employee that
could prove a breach of this duty of due care was entitled, at least in
theory, to full compensation for his injuries, including medical expenses,
7

See infra notes 150-54 for a discussion of the FAA’s role in this context.
E.g., PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE
WELFARE STATE: THE ORIGINS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 28 (2000).
9
E.g., id. at 28-29; JACK B. HOOD ET AL., WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AND
EMPLOYEE PROTECTION LAWS 1-2 (3d ed. 1999).
10
See FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 30; HOOD ET AL., supra note 9, at 1-2.
8
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lost wages, and pain and suffering.11 In addition to this post-injury
remedy, employees in riskier jobs would theoretically earn higher wages
than those employed in lower risk employments, a theoretical “risk
premium.”12 Employees earning a risk premium could, in theory, use this
extra money to purchase personal accident insurance.13 As a practical
matter, however, there is little evidence of correlation between riskier jobs
and higher wages during the years preceding the workers’ compensation
era.14
Under the negligence liability system, employers had three defenses:
the so-called “unholy trinity”15 of assumption of risk, negligence of a
fellow servant, and contributory negligence on the part of the injured
employee.16 The assumption of risk defense was far reaching; it provided a
defense against negligence claims by an employee when an accident arose
either from factors ordinary to the type of work the employee did or, in the
case of an extraordinary risk, if such extraordinary risk was acceptable to
the employee when he took the job.17 The fellow servant defense barred
recovery by an employee for injuries caused by the negligence of a coemployee.18 Some suggest that this defense, which prevented liability of
an employee to accrue to the employer despite the doctrine of respondeat
superior, had as its justification an assumption of risk theory, whereby the
employee assumed the risk of injury by a co-employee's negligence as one
of the ordinary risks of employment in general.19 The contributory
negligence defense barred recovery by an employee whose injury was to
any extent a result of his own negligence, even if the employer had been
more negligent.20 It is not hard to imagine how difficult it would be to
11

FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 30.
Id. at 31.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 49.
15
PETER M. LENCSIS, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: A REFERENCE AND GUIDE 7
(1998).
16
E.g., FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 30; HOOD ET AL., supra note 9, at 2-5;
1 JAMES J. LORIMER ET AL., THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF INSURANCE 322 (1st ed. 1978).
17
E.g., FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 30; HOOD ET AL., supra note 9, at 4-5;
LORIMER ET AL., supra note 16.
18
E.g., FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 31; HOOD ET AL., supra note 9, at 2-3;
LENCSIS, supra note 16, at 7.
19
E.g., HOOD ET AL., supra note 9, at 2-3; LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 7.
20
E.g., FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 31; HOOD ET AL., supra note 9, at 4;
LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 7. The history described here predates the rise of comparative
negligence as a replacement for contributory negligence. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Balentine,
833 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Tenn. 1992).
12
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prevail on a negligence claim with the foregoing defenses available to
their fullest extent.
B. Workers’ Compensation
Before proceeding to the transition in this country from a negligence
liability system to a workers’ compensation system, it is important to
understand both what workers’ compensation is and how it is different
from the negligence liability system. The most fundamental difference
between the two systems is that unlike the negligence system, injured
employees are entitled to compensation under the workers’ compensation
system without respect to fault or negligence.21 The threshold inquiry is
not whether the employer was negligent but rather whether the employee's
injury arose out of and in the course of employment.22 The workers’
compensation system is often described as a bargain,23 or a quid pro quo,24
between employers and employees.
Under a workers’ compensation system, employers lose all of their
common law defenses, and must pay benefits even when they were in no

Between 1920 and 1969, a few states began utilizing the principles of
comparative fault in all tort litigation. See C. Mutter, Moving to
Comparative Negligence in an Era of Tort Reform: Decisions for
Tennessee, 57 Tenn. L. Rev. [sic] 199, 227 n.127 (1990). Then,
between 1969 and 1984, comparative fault replaced contributory
negligence in 37 additional states. Id. at 228. In 1991, South Carolina
became the 45th state to adopt comparative fault, see Nelson v.
Concrete Supply Co. [sic], 303 S.C. 243, 399 S.E.2d 783 (1991),
leaving Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and Tennessee
as the only remaining common law contributory negligence
jurisdictions.
Id. (footnote omitted).
21
E.g., LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 9.
22
See, e.g., TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.011(10) (West 2009) (“‘Compensable
injury’ means an injury that arises out of and in the course and scope of employment for
which compensation is payable under this subtitle.”) (emphasis added); 1-3 LEX K.
LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 3.01 (2009); see also LENCSIS,
supra note 15, at 35-40 (distinguishing and explaining “arising out of” and “in the course
of”). See generally HOOD ET AL., supra note 9, at 60-69 (defining “in the course of
employment” and discussing employment scenarios involving risk sufficient to satisfy
“arose out of” criteria).
23
Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers’
Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 800-01 (1982).
24
LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 9.
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way at fault.25 In exchange, employers benefit from the sole remedy
doctrine, meaning that they are no longer liable in negligence for any
injury that is compensable under the workers’ compensation statute.26
Additionally, the benefits employers must pay under workers’
compensation statutes are predictable, as the statutes mandate them, and
they are typically less than the amount for which employers would be
liable in a successful negligence suit, at least with respect to lost wages
and non-economic damages.27 Employers remain liable under a workers’
compensation system for all of an injured employee's medical expenses.28
On the other hand, the amount employers must pay for lost wages is
typically limited by either a dollar amount cap or a cap calculated as a
percentage of the statewide average weekly wage.29 Moreover, employers
are typically not liable under workers’ compensation statutes for so-called
non-economic damages like pain and suffering and loss of consortium.30
On the employee side of the bargain, employees give up their right to
sue,31 and consequently their right to recover certain types of damages,
such as lost wages over the statutory cap and non-economic damages like
pain and suffering.32 In return for giving up these two birds in the bush,
25

HOOD ET AL., supra note 9, at 27.
Id. at 26-27; LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 9-10; see also TEX. LAB. CODE ANN.
§ 408.001(a) (West 2009) (offering Texas’s statutory articulation of the sole remedy
doctrine); 1-1 LARSON, supra note 22, at § 1.01 (describing a “typical” workers’
compensation act, including implementation of the sole remedy doctrine and
accompanying elimination of negligence analysis).
27
See LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 9-10, 52-53 (discussing the guarantee of
compensation and the corresponding tradeoff of full recovery for the employee); 1-1
LARSON, supra note 22, at § 1.03 (describing the limitation of compensation under
worker’s compensation to “disability”).
28
E.g., HOOD ET AL., supra note 9, at 93; LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 51. In Texas,
“[a]n employee who sustains a compensable injury is entitled to all health care
reasonably required by the nature of the injury as and when needed.” TEX. LAB. CODE
ANN. § 408.021(a) (West 2009) (emphasis added).
29
E.g., HOOD ET AL., supra note 9, at 97-98; LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 52-54. “A
weekly temporary income benefit may not exceed 100 percent of the state average
weekly wage.” TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.061.
30
E.g., LARSON, supra note 22, at § 1.03.
31
There are exceptions to this general rule, such as for injuries sustained outside of
the employer/employee relationship and instances in which the employer commits an
intentional tort. See LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 35-40, for a discussion of the “arising out
of and in the course of employment” scope of workers’ compensation.
32
See LARSON, supra note 22, at § 1.03 (discussing the amount of compensation and
limits on types of damages such as pain and suffering); LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 9
(describing the tradeoffs for guaranteed compensation under workers’ compensation
schemes, including loss of pain and suffering damages).
26
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employees receive a statutory bird in the hand. This comes in the form of
an entitlement to mandated benefits almost any time they suffer injury on
the job, without the need to sue or prove negligence.33 Finally, in theory,
both sides benefit from the reduced need for litigation, at least as to the
question of negligence.
C. The Shift to Workers’ Compensation
Workers’ Compensation systems began to appear in Europe in the
1880s.34 The shift from negligence liability systems to workers’
compensation systems occurred quickly in this country; in just one decade,
from 1910 to 1920, forty-three states adopted workers’ compensation
statutes, including Texas in 1913.35 Today, every state in the United States
has a workers’ compensation system.36 Fishback and Kantor conclude that
no single factor led to this rapid adoption, but rather that it arose due to a
convergence of interests between employers, labor, and insurance
companies.37 In other words, workers’ compensation was able to catch on
so quickly because all of the major stakeholders in the workers’
compensation debate wanted it, and there were essentially no major
players remaining to oppose it.38
1. Employers
It may at first seem strange that employers would favor a move to
workers’ compensation. In order to understand this position, it is important
to understand the shifting legal environment of the late 1800s and early
33

LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 9.
See Samuel B. Horovitz, Worldwide Workmen’s Compensation Trends, 59 KY.
L.J. 37, 40-41 (1970) (listing Germany in 1884, Austria in 1887, Norway in 1894,
Finland in 1895, Denmark, France, and Italy in 1898, Greece in 1901, Belgium and
Russia in 1903); see also Phil Hardberger, Texas Workers’ Compensation: A Ten Year
Survey–Strengths, Weaknesses, and Recommendations, 32 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 4 (2000)
(denoting the adoption of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1897 in Great Britain);
Epstein, supra note 23, at 797 (describing the influence of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act of 1897 on the United States system); HOOD ET AL., supra note 9, at 7 (noting
adoption of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1897 in Great Britain).
35
FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 58.
36
LORIMER ET AL., supra note 16, at 322; Horovitz, supra note 34, at 41; see also
LARSON, supra note 22, at § 2.08 (explaining that Hawaii was the final state to adopt a
workers' compensation system in 1963).
37
FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 113.
38
See id. at 89, 112-13.
34
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1900s. Labor's political strength was growing during this period.39 With
this increased clout, labor was successful in lobbying state legislatures to
pass statutory reforms in employer's liability, including statutory limitations on employers’ common law defenses.40 For example, in 1887, the
Massachusetts legislature limited the fellow-servant defense by making
any supervisory workers vice-principals of the employer, meaning that a
supervisor’s negligence was no longer a defense to an employer’s liability
claim.41 Massachusetts went even further in 1909 when it replaced
contributory negligence with comparative negligence.42 This meant that an
employee's claim was no longer barred by his own contributory negligence, but was merely reduced by the amount of his own negligence.43
Between 1900 and 1911, the number of states with employer’s liability
laws that restricted one or more of the common law defenses increased
from seven to twenty-three.44
In addition to these statutory limitations, the courts in some states were
also beginning to limit employers’ common law defenses.45 For example,
in Green v. Western American Co., the Washington Supreme Court
limited the assumption of risk and contributory negligence defenses in
cases involving a risk that the injured employee had previously brought to
his employer’s attention.46 Green involved a mineworker who had
requested timber to prop a section of a mine.47 The plaintiff’s supervisor
informed him that there was no timber available and that he should return
to work.48 The court held that in light of the fact that the employer was
statutorily required to have enough timber on hand for propping mines and
that the plaintiff had advised his supervisor of the need for timber to prop

39

Id. at 89.
See id. at 94-95; see also J.E. Rhodes, The Inception of Workmen’s Compensation
in the United States, 11 ME. L. REV. 35, 37-38 (1917) (noting the passage and effect of
the English Employer’s Liability Act); LARSON, supra note 22, at § 2.05 (discussing
Employer’s Liability Acts starting with the English Employer’s Liability Act of 1880);
Epstein, supra note 23, at 787-97 (noting the English Employer’s Liability Act that
imposed a qualified form of negligence liability on employers).
41
E.g., FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 94.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 96-97.
46
Green v. W. Am. Co., 70 P. 310, 320 (1902).
47
Id. at 311.
48
Id.
40
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the mine, the plaintiff had not assumed the risk.49 The court then proceeded to consider contributory negligence and observed:
Assumption of risk and contributory negligence approximate where the
danger is so obvious and imminent that no ordinarily prudent man
would assume the risk of injury therefrom. But where the danger,
though present and appreciated, is one which many men are in the habit
of assuming, and which prudent men who must earn a living are willing
to assume for extra compensation, one who assumes the risk cannot be
said to be guilty of contributory negligence if, having in view the risk
of danger assumed, he uses care reasonably commensurate with the risk
50
to avoid injurious consequences.

The court later remanded the case for trial because the jury had not
considered the question of whether the plaintiff’s care was commensurate
with the risk.51
The legislative and judicial trend toward restricting the common law
defenses available to employers led to uncertainty about the extent of
employer’s liability.52 This uncertainty led to increased litigation.53 In fact,
the number of non-railroad employer's liability cases before state supreme
courts jumped from 154 in 1900 to 490 in 1911.54 This legal uncertainty,
along with the concomitant increase in litigation, was one of the major
reasons employers supported the move to a no-fault workers’
compensation system.55 The other major reason was that employers
believed they could easily pass on this more predictable cost to their
employees in the form of lower wages.56
2. Labor
Organized labor initially favored reforms to the negligence liability
system over its wholesale replacement by a no-fault workers’
compensation system, and it was instrumental in achieving the legislative
reforms of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that limited
49

Id. at 318.
Id. at 318 (citing Narromore v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 96 F. 298,
304-05 (6th Cir. 1899)).
51
Id. at 318.
52
FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 98.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 95, 98.
55
Id. at 93-101.
56
Id. at 90.
50
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employers' common law defenses.57 Organized labor's initial opposition to
workers’ compensation was part of a more general distrust of government
regulation of the workplace, which unions feared would be unduly
influenced by business interests.58 As the labor-backed legislative reforms
to the negligence liability system came on line, however, labor’s position
on workers’ compensation began to shift.59 In spite of these reforms, large
numbers of workers were still left uncompensated.60 Although certain
employer defenses had been curtailed by the reforms, employees were still
required to show negligence in order to prevail.61 From a practical perspective, evidence of such negligence would likely often be in the hands
of the employer or could only be obtained with the cooperation of fellow
employees who were beholden to the employer for their livelihoods. As a
result, in 1909, the American Federation of Laborers, through its federal
and state branches, became a vocal proponent of workers’ compensation
statutes.62
3. The Insurance Industry
The insurance industry was a strong supporter of workers’
compensation legislation, at least in states where no state monopoly was
proposed.63 From the industry’s standpoint, such legislation would increase its customer base from those few workers that purchased personal
accident policies to every employee of every employer covered by the
statute.64 Additionally, the workers’ compensation system drastically
reduced adverse selection problems because in most cases, individual
employees would not be making the decision as to whether or not they
should get coverage.65 In a mandatory system, every employee in a job
57

Id. at 101.
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.; see also Green v. W. Am. Co., 70 P. 310, 320 (1902) (describing alleged
negligence causes of action in a worker personal injury case).
62
FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 101.
63
Id. at 109-12. In states with a monopolistic state fund, the state fund acts as the
sole workers’ compensation insurance carrier for the state. Private workers' compensation
insurance is not allowed in such states. E.g., LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 78. Thus, it is
understandable why the insurance industry would be opposed to legislation mandating a
monopolistic state fund.
64
FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 112.
65
Id. Adverse selection is a term of art in the risk management and insurance
industry. It refers to a situation in which individuals with low levels of risk opt out of the
58
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covered by the statute would be required to be covered, and thus the problem of only the riskiest employees entering the insurance market would be
completely obviated.
D. Compulsory Workers’ Compensation
Given that the interests of employers, labor, and the insurance industry
became aligned in the early 1900s, workers’ compensation statutes were
quickly adopted in most states.66 In stark contrast to modern statutes, of
which nearly all are compulsory and cover all industries,67 the majority of
early state statutes was either elective, only applicable to certain hazardous
industries, or had both of these features.68 The key to understanding why
the early statutes were not compulsory is to understand the constitutional
challenges to and justifications for the early statutes.
Moving from the negligence liability system to a no-fault workers’
compensation system was a shift that substantially affected the rights and
responsibilities of both employers and employees. This move was
challenged on several constitutional grounds, the most important of which
were the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses.69 Employers subject to compulsory compensation statutes argued
that forcing an employer to pay benefits to injured employees in cases
where the employer was not at fault was tantamount to depriving the
employer of its property without due process of the law.70 Employers
could be forced to pay benefits without any proof of wrongdoing or

insurance market. With fewer “good risks” in the market, the average cost of risk for
those that remain in the market increases. This is because the cost of the “bad risks” will
be distributed across fewer premium payers. As this cost increases, more good risks may
drop out fueling a cycle of increased costs and average losses. Mandatory participation
obviates this danger by not allowing “good risks,” or anyone else, to opt out.
66
Id. at 113.
67
U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 2009 ANALYSIS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
LAWS 10-13 (2009) [hereinafter CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ANALYSIS].
68
FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 103-04 tbl.4.3; LENCSIS, supra note 15, at
11-13.
69
LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 12.
70
See e.g., N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917) (holding the New
York Workmen’s Compensation Act does not violate the Due Process Clause); Hawkins
v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210 (1917) (holding the Iowa elective Workmen’s Compensation
Act did not violate the Due Process Clause); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243
U.S. 219 (1917) (holding the Washington Workmen’s Compensation Act does not violate
the Due Process Clause).
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negligence.71 Furthermore, to the extent that statutes defined which
employers were covered and which were not, covered employers raised
equal protection challenges claiming that they were deprived of the
common law defenses available to similarly situated employers that were
not covered under the statutes.72 Another constitutional challenge to
workers’ compensation statutes was that they interfered with the right of
employers and employees to contract.73
State legislatures implemented two common measures, sometimes in
combination, to protect their workers’ compensation statutes from these
constitutional challenges.74 The first was to make their statutes elective,
and the second was to restrict their scope to only certain hazardous
industries.75 Combinations of these two measures, such as a system that
was compulsory as to certain hazardous industries but elective as to all
others, were also enacted.76 If a compensation system is elective, it cannot
deprive an employer of its property without the employer electing to be
bound by the system.77 Elective systems are also non-disruptive of the
right to contract, especially where both the employer and employee are
permitted to elect whether or not to participate. The rationale for the
limitation of the scope of compensation statutes to hazardous industries is
different and proceeded as follows. Because states retain the power to
regulate matters of public health, safety, and welfare as part of the police
power, to the extent that compensation statutes applied only to hazardous
industries, they could be viewed as public safety and welfare regulation,
which is within the power reserved to the states.78
The United States Supreme Court confirmed that either of these
approaches was sufficient to overcome constitutional objections. In 1917,
71

Hawkins, 243 U.S. at 210; N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 243 U.S. at 188; Mountain Timber
Co., 243 U.S. at 219.
72
See Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.S. 571, 571 (1915) (stating that employers
do not waive common law defenses if they fail to comply with state workers’
compensation statutes); see also FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8 at 103-04 tbl.4.3;
LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 11-13.
73
See N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 243 U.S. at 206 (explaining that freedom of contract is
included in the right to liberty and the right to private property). Both of these rights are
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution against
deprivation by the federal or state governments respectively, without due process of law.
U.S. CONST. amend. V & XIV.
74
E.g., LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 13.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
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the Supreme Court considered New York and Washington state
compensation statutes, which were compulsory as to certain hazardous
industries, as well as the Iowa compensation statute, which was elective.79
The Court issued separate opinions upholding each of these statutes on the
same day.80 In upholding the New York statute, the Court held, “[i]t
cannot be pronounced arbitrary and unreasonable for the State to impose
upon the employer the absolute duty of making a moderate and definite
compensation in money to every injured employee ….”81 Speaking
directly to the police power justification, the Court further stated, “[t]he
subject matter in respect of which freedom of contract is restricted is the
matter of compensation for human life or limb lost or disability incurred in
the course of hazardous employment, and the public has a direct interest in
this as affecting the common welfare.”82
For states that were inclined to extend compulsory coverage to the
greatest number of workers possible, the question remained as to how far a
state legislature could go in its definition of hazardous employments. The
Supreme Court addressed this question in 1922 in the case of Ward &
Gow v. Krinsky.83 In Ward, the Court considered a provision in the New
York compensation statute that classified any business employing more
than four “workmen or operatives” as hazardous.84 Workmen and
operatives were terms of art that essentially meant manual laborers or
machine operators.85 The provision under consideration provided that a
business with four or more manual laborers was compelled to provide
workers’ compensation insurance for all of its employees, not just those
doing the hazardous work.86 The Court, employing somewhat strained
logic,87 upheld the statute, holding that “[t]he Legislature, in the New
York system, is justified in extending the benefits of the Compensation
79

Id.
See N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 188 (1917) (upholding the New
York Workmen’s Compensation statute); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 210 (1917)
(upholding the Iowa elective Workmen’s Compensation statute); Mountain Timber Co. v.
Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 219 (1917) (upholding the Washington Workmen’s
Compensation statute).
81
N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 243 U.S. at 205.
82
Id. at 206.
83
Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U.S. 503 (1922).
84
Id. at 506-07.
85
Id. at 527 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
86
Id. at 506-07.
87
Id. at 513 (reasoning “[t]hat there was inherent hazard in Krinsky’s occupation is
conclusively shown by the fact that in the course of it he received a serious and disabling
personal injury arising out of it”).
80
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Law as far as it reasonably may determine occupational hazard to
extend—to the ‘vanishing point’ as it were ….”88 Thus, the Court left the
states with broad discretion to determine where hazard existed. States
could extend their compensation systems to cover any employment that
had even remote chances of causing injury rather than discarding hazard
as a requirement for a valid exercise of the police power.89
In a case the following year, the Supreme Court considered “a
compulsory compensation act establishing in all except certain
employments, an exclusive system governing compensation for injuries to
employees resulting in disability or death.”90 The issue before the Court in
Madera was not the facial constitutionality of the statute, but whether the
statute was constitutional, as applied, in requiring payment of death
benefits to foreign national beneficiaries living in a foreign country.91
Nevertheless, the Court began its analysis by affirming the facial
constitutionality of the California statute, noting, “[t]his Court has in
several cases sustained the constitutionality of workmen’s compensation
acts, from which the California Act in its constitutional aspects is not
distinguishable.”92
Madera illustrates how Ward essentially eliminated the hazard
requirement. The Court in Ward granted state legislatures the power to
define occupational hazard even to the “vanishing point.”93 California
defined hazard in such a way that its compulsory compensation system
extended to “all except certain employments.”94 Without pausing to
analyze whether hazard existed in “all but certain employments,” the
Court summarily stated that California’s Act was not distinguishable in
any constitutional aspect from any of the compensation statutes it had
previously upheld and that it was a valid exercise of the state's police
power.95 Thus, post Ward, states were unburdened by the hazard
requirement and were free to extend their compulsory compensation
systems to cover all, or at least nearly all, employees.

88

Id. at 520.
Id. at 520-21.
90
Madera Sugar Pine Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 262 U.S. 499, 499 (1923)
(emphasis added).
91
Id. at 500-01.
92
Id. at 501 (citing Ward, 259 U.S. 503).
93
Ward, 259 U.S at 520.
94
Id. at 499.
95
Madera, 262 U.S. at 501.
89
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Over the years, nearly every state amended its workers’ compensation
statutes to make coverage compulsory.96 Today, workers’ compensation is
compulsory in all but one state—Texas.97 Some states have exceptions to
the general rule for narrow groups of specific employees like casual
employees, domestic employees, and farm laborers, while others exempt
employers with fewer than five employees.98 But aside from these
exceptions, workers’ compensation is compulsory even in these states for
the vast majority of employers and employees.99
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, in its 2009 Analysis of Workers’
Compensation Laws, states that only three states presently have an elective
workers’ compensation system: New Jersey, South Dakota, and Texas.100
While New Jersey's statute is technically elective, it requires that opt-out
employers carry liability insurance to cover their common law liability
arising out of workplace injuries.101 As such, insurance has never been
available in New Jersey; the practical result is that opting out is not an
option in that state.102
The classification of South Dakota as an elective state in table 1 of the
2009 Analysis may have been a clerical error.103 South Dakota's statute is
technically elective, but any employer that opts out is liable to action by
injured employees who are permitted to proceed as if the employer had
opted in. Injured employees still do not have to prove negligence even if
96

LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 13.
Id.; see also TEX. DEP’T OF INS. WORKERS’ COMP. RESEARCH & EVALUATION
GRP., COMPARISON OF STATE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION SYSTEMS 5 tbl.1 (2008),
available at http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/wc/regulation/documents/wc0904compare.zip
[hereinafter COMPARISON OF SYSTEMS] (citing U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 2003
ANALYSIS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAWS (2003)) (comparing state workers’
compensation systems); TEX. DEP’T OF INS. WORKERS’ COMP. RESEARCH & EVALUATION
GRP., EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION IN THE TEXAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION SYSTEM:
2008 ESTIMATES 2 (2008), available at http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/reports/wcreg/documents/2008_Employer_Partic.ppt [hereinafter EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008]
(discussing employer participation in the Texas worker’s compensation system);
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ANALYSIS, supra note 67 (listing the characteristics of states’
workers’ compensation systems).
98
LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 13; CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ANALYSIS, supra note 67.
99
LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 13; COMPARISON OF SYSTEMS, supra note 97 at 5 tbl.1;
EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008, supra note 97, at 2; CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
ANALYSIS, supra note 67.
100
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ANALYSIS, supra note 67.
101
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-72 (West 2010); LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 111.
102
LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 111.
103
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ANALYSIS, supra note 67, at 22. Table II of the same
report states that workers' compensation in South Dakota is “[c]ompulsory as to all
employment. Elective as to employer performing labor incidental to job.” Id.
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the employer opted out.104 Moreover, the measure of damages in such a
suit is 100 percent of the medical expense payments that would have been
due under the workers’ compensation statute plus two times the amount
recoverable under other provisions of the statute, such as lost wages.105
In New Jersey and South Dakota, damages recoverable are greater if
an employer “opts out” with no corresponding reduction in the employee's
ability to obtain damages.106 Thus, the only state that allows nearly all of
its employers to elect whether to participate in the workers’ compensation
system is Texas.107
II. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN TEXAS
A. Overview
Texas’s workers’ compensation system has been elective since it was
first adopted in 1913.108 Employers in the state can choose whether or not
to subscribe to the workers’ compensation system.109 To opt out of the
workers’ compensation system, an employer need only notify the
Workers’ Compensation Division of the Texas Department of Insurance of
its election to opt out110 and notify its employees of this election upon
hiring and via notices posted in conspicuous locations in the workplace.111
In 2008, 33 percent of Texas employers opted out of the workers’
compensation system.112 These employers employed 25 percent of the
state’s employees.113 Twenty-six percent of the largest employers in
Texas, those with more than 500 employees, opted out in 2008, and the
smallest employers, those with four or fewer employees, opted out at a
104

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 62-3-11 (2009).
Id.
106
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-72 (West 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 62-3-11.
107
LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 13; COMPARISON OF SYSTEMS, supra note 97;
EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008, supra note 97, at 2; CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
ANALYSIS, supra note 67.
108
EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008, supra note 97, at 2, 4 (relying heavily on the
data contained in this report). The report is based on a survey of 2,585 employers
conducted by the Texas Department of Insurance and the Public Policy Research Institute
at Texas A&M University. Id. The authors of the report estimate that their statistical
findings have a 2.4 percent margin of error at the 95 percent confidence level. Id.
109
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.002(a) (West 2009).
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008, supra note 97, at 6.
113
Id. at 7.
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rate of 40 percent.114 The top reasons reported for opting out of the
workers’ compensation system in 2008 were: (1) workers’ compensation
premiums were too high (26 percent); (2) the employer had too few
employees (26 percent); (3) the employer was not required to carry
workers’ compensation (11 percent); (4) the employer had few on-the-job
injuries (9 percent); and (5) medical costs in the workers’ compensation
system were too high.115 The top reasons reported by non-subscribing
employers with greater than 500 employees were: (1) workers’
compensation premiums were too high; (2) medical costs in the workers’
compensation system were too high; and because (3) they had too few
injuries.116
For subscribing employers, the workers’ compensation system works
much the same in Texas as it does in other states. The system for nonsubscribers, the term of art used in Texas for employers that have opted
out of the workers’ compensation system, is quite different and warrants
some explanation. Non-subscribing employers are subject essentially to
the negligence liability system described supra in part I.A, with some
modifications.117 For an injured employee to recover damages from a nonsubscribing employer, he must show that the employer was negligent.118 In
such a negligence case, the employer is barred by statute from raising the
common law defenses of assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and
negligence of a fellow employee.119 Thus, once the employee has proven
negligence, he is entitled to recover regardless of his own contributory
negligence, the negligence of a fellow employee, or his assumption of the
risk.120
Each individual employee in Texas is also permitted to opt out of the
workers’ compensation system if he works for an employer that has opted
in.121 To do so, an employee must provide his employer with written
notice of his election within five days of either the day he began work or
the day he received written notice that the employer participated in the
workers’ compensation system.122 Unlike situations where the employer
114

Id. at 8.
Id. at 13.
116
Id. at 14.
117
See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033 (West 2009) (listing the defenses that are
unavailable to employers).
118
See id. (listing the defenses that are unavailable to employers); see also LENCSIS,
supra note 15, at 111.
119
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033(a).
120
Id.
121
Id. § 406.034(a).
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Id. § 406.034(b).
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has opted out, the employer retains the defenses of assumption of risk,
contributory negligence, and negligence of a fellow employee when the
employee opts out and later brings suit.123
B. Alternative Benefit Plans
Although they have no obligation to do so, many non-subscribing
employers provide benefits to their injured employees as part of their risk
management and employee benefit programs.124 These employers fund
occupational injury benefits through various mechanisms, including selffunding and multiple forms of insurance, such as excess indemnity
insurance, standard occupational accident insurance, and group health
insurance.125 In 2008, 52 percent of non-subscribing employers, covering
82 percent of employees of non-subscribers, provided occupational injury
benefits.126 Fifty-one percent of non-subscribing small employers, 89
percent of non-subscribing mid-size employers, and 83 percent of nonsubscribing large employers provided some form of occupational injury
benefits.127 The stratified percentages of the non-subscriber workforce
covered by occupational injury benefits were as follows: 62 percent of
employees of small non-subscribers, 90 percent of medium sized nonsubscribers, and 86 percent of large non-subscribers.128
Employers providing occupational injury benefits have no duty to
provide a level of benefits equivalent to that provided by workers’
compensation.129 Of the 52 percent of non-subscribing employers that paid
occupational injury benefits in 2008,130 only 70 percent covered medical
costs.131 Of those that covered medical costs, 63 percent covered expenses
for as long as they were medically necessary, while the remaining 37
percent capped medical expenses either with a dollar limit, a time limit, or
both.132 Applying these percentages to the larger universe of non123

Id. § 406.034(d).
Hardberger, supra note 34, at 7; EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008, supra note 97,
at 22-28.
125
EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008, supra note 97, at 26.
126
Id. at 23.
127
Id. at 24.
128
Id. at 24.
129
Hardberger, supra note 34, at 7; EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008, supra note 97,
at 22-28. Employers are not required to pay any benefits absent a showing of negligence.
Id.
130
EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008, supra note 97, at 23.
131
Id. at 27.
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Id.
124

342

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:323

subscribers, the total percentage of non-subscribers that provided a
medical expense benefit to injured employees in 2008 was approximately
36 percent, with approximately 23 percent of non-subscribers providing
benefits for as long as medically necessary and 13 percent providing
benefits up to a time or dollar limit.133 The numbers are similar for wage
replacement benefits. Approximately 35 percent of all non-subscribers
paid occupational injury benefits and 68 percent of those non-subscribers
paid wage replacement benefits in 2008.134 Of these, 57 percent paid wage
replacement benefits for the entire duration of the employee's lost time;
the remaining 43 percent paid wage replacement benefits subject to a
durational or dollar limit.135 Again, applying these percentages to the
larger universe of non-subscribers, only about 20 percent of non-subscribers provided wage replacement benefits for the entire duration of their
employees’ lost time.
C. Waiver & Arbitration Provisions
Texas has worked hard to maintain a balance between maintaining a
viable alternative to traditional workers’ compensation on the one hand
and protecting employees from employer overreaching on the other. For
example, prior to 2001, non-subscribing employers could condition an
employee's future receipt of occupational injury benefits on the employee
waiving his rights to any common law negligence claims prior to suffering
any injury, such as at the time of hire.136 The benefit to the employer was
that it could more easily calculate its exposure to occupational injury benefits claims and negligence claims because it would know ex ante which
remedy was available to each employee.137 Many, however, believed this
was unfair because the employee was being asked to waive the rights
normally waived under a full-fledged workers’ compensation system in
exchange for what was often an inferior package of benefits.138 Moreover,
the employee was being asked to do so before suffering an injury, when it
was most unlikely that he would have the assistance of a lawyer to help
him evaluate the bargain. The Texas Legislature responded to this concern
133

See id. (detailing payments of medical benefits by non-subscriber employers).
Id. at 28.
135
Id.
136
See, e.g., Lawrence v. CDB Servs., Inc., 44 S.W.3d 544, 554 (Tex. 2001) (holding
that the Texas statute did not clearly prohibit pre-injury waivers, and as such, the court
lacked authority to read such a prohibition into the statute).
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Hardberger, supra note 34, at 10.
138
Id. at 19.
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in 2001 by amending the labor code to proscribe such pre-injury
waivers.139
Another abuse of the waiver for alternative benefits bargain was the
use of post-injury waivers that followed too closely in time to the injury.
The concern was that employers could exact a waiver from the employee
at the moment the employee was most vulnerable—right after an injury
and while awaiting care.140 In other words, an employer could show up at
the hospital while the employee was awaiting treatment for his injury with
an offer to pay for treatment in exchange for the employee’s waiver of his
right to any legal action against the employer. The Texas Legislature acted
in 2005 to prohibit this practice by amending the labor code to prohibit
certain post-injury waivers.141 Post-injury waivers are now permitted only
so long as they meet certain requirements.142 These requirements are that:
(1) the employee enters the waiver with knowledge of the waiver’s effect;
(2) the waiver is entered into not earlier than the tenth business day after
the initial report of injury; (3) before signing the waiver, the employee has
been evaluated by a non-emergency physician; and (4) the waiver is in a
writing under which the true intent of the parties is specifically stated.143
With pre-injury waivers abolished and post-injury waivers more strictly
regulated, a new frontier has opened up in the continuing struggle to
maintain the balance between preserving a viable alternative to workers’
compensation and assuring fairness to employees.
A second tool non-subscribing employers use to protect against lawsuits in cases where they have provided or will provide occupational injury benefits is requiring the employee to sign an arbitration agreement.144
In 2008, 14 percent of non-subscribers asked their employees to sign an
agreement to resolve disputes through arbitration.145 Of these, 95 percent

139

TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033(e) (West 2009).
See, e.g., Bison Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. Sambrano, No. 01-07-00003, 2008 Tex.
App. LEXIS 4844, at *8 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. June 26, 2008) (involving the
employer’s delivery of a post-injury waiver to the employee, while the employee awaited
treatment, stating “in electing to accept benefits under the PLAN, I understand and agree
to give up the right to file a legal action against the Company … for any and all damages
sustained by me because of my injury”).
141
Id. at *9 n.6.
142
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033(f).
143
Id.
144
See Hardberger, supra note 34, at 12-15 (discussing the use of arbitration
provisions to limit employee causes of action); EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008, supra
note 97, at 29-31 (quantifying the use of arbitration).
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EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008, supra note 97, at 30.
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asked their employees to sign the arbitration agreement pre-injury.146
Among non-subscribing employers that utilized arbitration agreements, 36
percent stated they would not provide an employee medical or wage replacement benefits if the employee did not agree to arbitration.147 One
subtle way that arbitration agreements affect employee’s rights is by the
employer’s selection of the arbiter. In 2008, 74 percent of non-subscribing
employers that utilized arbitration reported knowing who served as the
arbiter in arbitration proceedings.148 Of these, more than half reported that
the arbiter was either a single person who works for the employer and
always serves as the employer's arbiter or a single person who works for
the employer but is mutually agreed upon by the employer and the
employee.149
In addition to this threat of bias, utilization of arbitration agreements
affects employees’ rights in a number of much more direct and serious
ways. First, several courts of appeals in Texas have found that when a preinjury waiver of common law claims is included in an arbitration
agreement, the statutory prohibition against pre-injury waivers is
preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),150 at least in cases
involving an employer that in any way participates in interstate
commerce.151 Therefore, an employer, who would otherwise be prohibited
by statute from requiring an employee to sign a pre-injury waiver of his
right to sue the employer in exchange for participation in the employer’s
146

Id.
Id.
148
Id. at 31.
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Id.
150
9 U.S.C. § 1 (2009).
151
See Bison Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. Sambrano, No. 01-07-00003, 2008 Tex. App.
LEXIS 4844, at *34 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. June 26, 2008) (“[W]e … now hold
that the FAA preempts any potential application of the Texas non-waiver provision stated
in Labor Code section 406.033(e) to prevent enforcement of the arbitration clause stated
in [the] Labor Code.”); In re Border Steel, Inc., 229 S.W.3d 825, 832 (Tex. Ct. App.
2007) (“[T]he FAA preempts the application of the Texas non-waiver provision to
prevent the enforcement of the Arbitration Agreement at issue here.”); In re R & R Pers.
Specialists of Tyler, Inc., 146 S.W.3d 699, 704 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (“We conclude that
the FAA preempts the application of the nonwaiver provision to prevent or restrict
enforcement of the arbitration provisions at issue here.”). These holdings are consistent
with the holdings of other courts on the preemption by the FAA of various non-waiver
provisions. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding that the
FAA preempted a non-waiver provision in California’s franchise statute); Jack B. Anglin
Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1992) (holding that the FAA preempted a non-waiver
provision in the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices–Consumer Protection Act); Commerce
Park at DFW Freeport v. Mardian Constr. Co., 729 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1984).
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occupational injury benefits program, can now do so indirectly by simply
including the pre-injury waiver as part of an arbitration agreement.152
Still more troubling for employees is the practice of conditioning
employment on acceptance of the waiver and arbitration agreement. This
is possible because the FAA applies to employment contracts in general,
with a small exception for employment contracts for transportation
workers.153 As the court in Swift pointed out, agreements regarding the
relationship between employers and at-will employees are considered
employment contracts in Texas for this and other purposes.154 Thus, the
court in Bison, for example, held that an employee was bound by an
arbitration agreement as a matter of law by virtue of the employee
continuing to work for the employer after having received notice of the
agreement.155 In reaching its conclusion, the court relied in part on In re
Halliburton, an earlier decision by the Texas Supreme Court.156
Conditioning employment on the acceptance of an arbitration and waiver
agreement essentially immunizes an employer from a negligence lawsuit
by its employees without subjecting it to the requirements of the workers’
compensation system.157 An employer can provide benefits that are
inferior to those required under workers’ compensation and still receive
the principle benefit of the workers’ compensation system by requiring
employees to agree to waive their common law claims as part of an
arbitration agreement.
It is unclear at this point whether and how the Texas Legislature can
respond to this new threat to the careful balance it has struggled to
maintain. Because the case law on FAA preemption of non-waiver
provisions appears to be so well settled at the federal level,158 federal
152

See supra text accompanying note 151.
9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001);
see also In re Swift Transp. Co., 311 S.W.3d 484, 488 (Tex. App. 2009) (holding that an
arbitration agreement in a non-subscriber’s occupational injury benefit plan was part of
an employment contract since employees could not opt-out of participation and that since
the employee in issue was involved in transportation, the arbitration agreement was not
enforceable under the FAA).
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See Swift Transp., 311 S.W.3d at 489 (citing Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767
S.W.2d 686, 689 (Tex. 1989)).
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Bison Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. Sambrano, No. 01-07-00003, 2008 Tex. App.
LEXIS 4844, at *18 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. June 26, 2008).
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In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566, 572-73 (2002) (holding that an at-will
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legislative action may be required, such as amending the FAA to apply to
employment contracts only to the extent that it does not interfere with the
operation of non-waiver provisions in the labor and employment codes of
the states. As there is no indication that such federal action is pending,
FAA preemption remains a serious and potentially existential threat to
Texas's non-mandatory workers’ compensation system.
D. Retaliatory Discharge
Texas provides a statutory bar to employers discharging or in any
other way discriminating against an employee because the employee has
filed a workers’ compensation claim.159 In 1998, the Texas Supreme Court
addressed the question of whether this non-discrimination provision in an
earlier version of the statute applied to non-subscribing employers.160 The
court in Bouchet held that it did not.161 This means that non-subscribing
employers are not barred from taking adverse employment actions against
their injured employees.162 As a matter of public policy, this loophole
should be closed. A right to a benefit is meaningless in the employment
context if the employer can simply deter employees from exercising it
through retaliation against those employees that do.
III. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION RISK FINANCING
A. Overview
The top reason reported by non-subscribing employers in Texas for
opting out of the workers’ compensation system was that workers’
compensation insurance premiums were too high.163 In order to evaluate
this justification, it is important to understand the various risk financing
mechanisms utilized by employers under a workers’ compensation system
and to understand how these differ from opting out of the workers’
compensation system altogether.
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TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 451.001 (West 2009).
See Tex. Mexican Ry. v. Bouchet, 963 S.W.2d 52, 53 (Tex. 1998).
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See id. at 56 (holding that an employee’s action for retaliation cannot stand if not
covered by the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act).
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B. Guaranteed Cost Plans
Guaranteed cost workers’ compensation insurance is the most basic
form of risk financing.164 The employer pays a premium to an insurance
company, and the insurance company pays the employer’s workers’
compensation claims.165 The insurance company bears the entire risk of
paying the claims and thus the risk of inability to pay claims is minimal.166
Most small to mid-size employers purchase guaranteed cost workers’
com-pensation insurance.167 Guaranteed cost workers’ compensation
premiums are calculated based on a number of factors. First, the insurer
determines how to classify the predominant type of work done by the
employer, what is known as the employer’s governing classification.168
Each insurance company that writes workers’ compensation in a state files
its rates with the state for each of these classifications, or class codes as
they are known in the industry.169 This filed rate is then multiplied by the
employer’s payroll to determine the premium.170
In addition to the filed rate and the payroll, insurers may add factors to
adjust for the loss experience of the employer.171 One such factor is called
an experience modification factor, or “experience mod.”172 The experience
mod for an employer is a comparison between the employer’s historical
loss experience and the historical loss experience of all employers in the
same class code.173 An experience mod of greater than one will result in an
164

The author of this Note spent six years working as a licensed commercial
insurance broker for one of the two largest brokers in the world. Much of this section
reflects general commercial insurance knowledge the author acquired working in the
insurance industry. For additional information on risk financing, see generally RICHARD
BERTHELSEN, ET AL., RISK FINANCING (4th ed. 2006), which provides a detailed treatment
of risk financing.
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modification factor, see Calculating a Firm’s Experience Modification Factor,
WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES, http://www.lni.wa.gov/

348

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:323

increased premium, and an experience mod of less than one will result in a
reduced premium.174 Insurance carriers may also apply other more
discretionary credits to achieve a premium level that is acceptable to the
client and profitable to the carrier.175
While experience mods and discretionary credits can substantially
affect workers’ compensation premiums, the carriers’ filed rates, which
form the basis of guaranteed cost premiums, are not discretionary.176
These are subject to year over year fluctuation based not only on the
combined loss experience in each class code, but also on conditions in the
broader insurance market like the cost and availability of reinsurance,
insured losses across all lines, and investment returns.177 For these
reasons, employers insured under guaranteed cost programs are the ones
most susceptible to fluctuations in the insurance market and to paying
premiums that are the most out of proportion to their losses.178 In order to
avoid this result, larger employers that have reached a critical mass and
predictability of expected losses tend to favor loss sensitive plans.179
C. Loss Sensitive Plans
“Loss sensitive plans” is a term of art that describes any type of
insurance plan in which the insured will pay more if losses are greater than
expected and pay less if losses are less than expected.180 There are a
number of types of loss sensitive plans, including retrospective rating
plans,181 group captives,182 self-insurance,183 and large deductible plans.184
This Note will provide a brief description of the latter two, as they are the
simplest to understand and also the most common.
ClaimsIns/Insurance/RatesRisk/How/ExpFactor/ExpModFactor/Default.asp (last visited
Feb. 26, 2011) (Washington State Department of Labor).
174
See Workers’ Compensation Risk Classification, supra note 168.
175
See e.g., BERTHELSEN, ET AL., supra note 164, at 3.27, 3.30 (explaining that
insurers may choose to give the insured a lower premium if they accept a higher
deductible and vice versa, and stating that larger deductible plans are more common with
workers’ compensation insurance).
176
Id. at 2.31-2.32.
177
See generally id. at 2.31-2.32 (referring to these fluctuations as the “underwriting
cycle”). For a detailed explanation of reinsurance, see id. at 7.3-7.4.
178
See generally id. at 2.31-2.32 (addressing fluctuations in premiums).
179
See generally id. at 1.11-1.12.
180
Id. at 13.11.
181
See generally id. at ch. 6 (discussing retrospective rating plans).
182
See generally id. at ch. 8 (discussing captive insurance plans).
183
See generally id. at ch. 5 (discussing self-insurance plans).
184
See generally id. at ch. 3 (discussing large deductible plans).
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Self-insurance is permitted in nearly every state, including Texas.185 A
typical self-insurance program works as follows. First, an employer must
qualify as a self-insurer with the state’s insurance department.186 Qualification typically involves an analysis of the employer’s loss history and
its financial statements over a certain period of time to ensure that the
employer will have the financial wherewithal to pay its claims.187 Other
requirements often include the payment of a surcharge and the posting of a
bond with the state to guaranty payment of claims.188
Once an employer has qualified, it will typically analyze its loss
forecasts.189 A loss forecast is an actuarial tool that calculates an
employer’s expected losses in each year at various loss limits.190 A loss
limit is simply a cap on the value of each loss.191 Through the loss forecast
analysis, an employer may, for example, determine that it expects to have
$7,500,000 in total workers’ compensation claims with $7,000,000 a year
in losses under $500,000; $6,000,000 in losses under $250,000, and
$5,000,000 in losses under $100,000. With this data, the employer can
seek excess workers’ compensation insurance quotes with different selfinsured retentions (SIRs).192 Assuming that the actual losses exactly
matched the predictions in the loss forecast, if the employer chose an SIR
of $100,000, it would pay $5,000,000 in workers’ compensation claims
out of pocket, and its insurance company would pay the remaining
$2,500,000. Similarly, if the employer chose a $500,000 SIR, it would pay
$7,000,000 in workers’ compensation claims, and its insurance company
would pay the remaining $500,000.
In a world of perfect information, an employer would be best served
by selecting the $500,000 SIR. This is because the insurance company will
charge any amount of loss forecast over the loss limit in premium. Thus, if
the employer elected the $100,000 SIR, the insurance company would
start its premium calculations at $2,500,000, the amount of losses
expected over the SIR. To this number would be applied expense, profit,
185

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ANALYSIS, supra note 67, at 10-13.
See generally BERTHELSEN, ET AL., supra note 164, at ch. 5 (discussing selfinsurance plans).
187
See id. (discussing self-insurance plans).
188
See generally id. (discussing self-insurance plans).
189
See generally id. at 4.34, 4.37 (describing the use of information provided by loss
forecasts).
190
See generally id. at 4.34 (describing the use of information provided by loss
forecasts).
191
See generally id. at 4.34, 4.37 (describing the use of information provided by loss
forecasts).
192
See generally id.
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and risk factors. In contrast, at a $500,000 SIR, the insurance company
would start at $500,000, and apply its expense, profit, and risk factors to
this lower amount. Assuming that expenses beyond the expected losses
ran at 15 percent,193 and assuming the losses came in as expected, the
expenses paid at the $100,000 SIR would be $375,000 while they would
be only $75,000 at the $500,000 SIR. The total cost of risk to the
employer, again based on the assumptions already laid out, would be the
sum of the losses the employer retained, plus the premiums charged by the
insurance company. At the $100,000 SIR, the total cost would be
$5,000,000 in retained losses, plus a premium of $2,500,000 representing
the insurer’s expected losses, plus $375,000 representing the insurer’s
expense and profits, for a total of $7,875,000. At the $500,000 SIR, the
total would be $7,000,000 in retained losses, plus $500,000 representing
the insurer’s expected losses, plus $75,000 representing the insurer's profit
and expenses, for a total of $7,575,000. Of course, there is no such thing
as perfect information, and many employers will trade the increased
expense for a lower amount of risk. To understand how this works, assume
there are two additional losses beyond what was predicted in the loss
forecast. Assume both of these losses cost $500,000 each. The additional
cost to the employer with the $100,000 SIR would be $200,000, two
losses capped at $100,000 each. The additional cost of these losses to the
employer with the $500,000 SIR, on the other hand, would be $1,000,000.
In a year with these two “extra” losses, the employer with the $100,000
SIR would have a total cost of risk of $8,075,000 whereas the employer
with the $500,000 SIR would have a total cost of risk of $8,575,000.
Notice in each of these hypotheticals that far and away the largest
component in the total cost of risk is the actual losses.
A similar concept to self-insurance is the large deductible program.194
The fundamental difference between a large deductible program and selfinsurance is the party ultimately liable to the injured worker.195 In self193

This figure is for illustrative purposes only. According to a survey of its clients,
Marsh, Inc., one of the world’s two largest commercial insurance brokers, puts the
percentage of workers’ compensation costs attributable directly to claims and related
handling expenses at 91 percent for clients with loss sensitive plans. MARSH, INC.,
CASUALTY COST OF RISK 2008 2 (2009), available at http://global.marsh.com/
documents/CasualtyCostofRisk_Report2008.pdf. The purpose of this section is not to
estimate the exact expense ratio an employer can expect, but rather to demonstrate that
even at a conservative 15 percent, the bulk of an employer’s workers’ compensation costs
is directly attributable to its losses.
194
See BERTHELSEN, ET AL., supra note 164, at 3.3 (discussing large deductible
plans).
195
See id. (discussing uses of large deductible plans).
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insurance, the employer is directly liable to the employee, and the
insurer’s liability does not attach until the employer has paid the entire
amount of the self-insured retention.196 In a large deductible program, on
the other hand, the insurer is directly liable to the injured employee and
must recover deductible payments from the employer.197 Thus, the risk
that the employer will not pay rests with the employee in a self-insured
plan and with the insurance company in a deductible plan. Accordingly,
states, on behalf of employees, protect against this risk by analyzing
employers’ financial ability to pay claims and by taking other steps like
requiring security and collecting surcharges to fund unpaid claims.198
Insurance companies perform the same functions when they write large
deductible plans.199
IV. HOW EMPLOYERS SAVE MONEY BY OPTING OUT
With this understanding of the more conventional risk financing
structures for funding workplace injuries, it becomes apparent that there
are essentially two ways that non-subscribers can reduce their workplace
injury cost of risk. The first is for an employer to simply forgo providing
any benefits and trust that its costs of defending and paying common law
negligence claims will be lower than its cost of buying workers’
compensation insurance. The second is for an employer to entice its
employees to waive their common law negligence claims or agree to
arbitrate their injury claims in exchange for occupational injury benefits
that are less costly than those that would be provided under workers’
compensation.
A. Assuming the Risk of Negligence Claims
Approximately 48 percent of non-subscribing Texas employers did not
provide occupational injury benefits in 2008.200 Employees of these
employers accounted for 18 percent of the “non-subscriber” workforce.201
The question that states considering elective workers’ compensation need
to answer is why nearly half of non-subscribing employers do not provide
196

See id. at 5.3-4 (describing the purpose and operation of self-insurance plans).
See id. at 3.30 (discussing the purpose and operation of large deductible plans).
198
See id. at 5.10 (describing the processes of regulatory filing for employers).
199
See id. at 3.30 (discussing insured organizations’ obligations to provide security
to insurers for large deductible plans).
200
EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008, supra note 97, at 23.
201
Id.
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occupational injury benefits. Part of the answer may be that over the years,
partially through elimination of the common law defenses of assumption
of risk, contributory negligence, and negligence of a fellow employee,202
the Texas Legislature and courts have struck a balance: the negligence
system is neither so favorable to employers that they all opt to take their
chances in court nor so favorable to employees that no employer dares to
opt out of the workers’ compensation system. An imbalance would
quickly lead to a mass shift to the more favorable position.
A look behind the numbers reveals, however, that there is something
else going on. Small employers paid occupational benefits at a much lower
rate than medium and large employers.203 There may be perfectly valid
reasons for this split. For example, it may be that a certain critical mass of
employees, payroll, or losses is required to make some types of
occupational injury benefits economical. Nevertheless, this raises a serious
concern about the ability of these employers to pay claims. As discussed
supra in Part III, the traditional workers’ compensation risk financing
mechanisms each account for the risk inability to pay claims.204 Where the
risk is transferred to insurance companies, as in guaranteed cost and large
deductible plans, insurer solvency regulations and state guaranty funds
provide protection against this risk.205 Where the risk remains with the
employer, as in self-insurance plans, the states protect against this risk by
requiring financial reporting and collateral.206 The Texas opt-out system,
however, provides no such guarantees that negligence claims against an
employer will be paid. The cost of such unpaid claims will be borne by the
injured employees and potentially by society as a whole through social
safety net programs like Social Security and Medicaid.
As a policy matter, this result should not be acceptable. Employers that
retain the risk of negligence in lawsuits should not be any less accountable
than those that retain the risk of workers’ compensation claims through a
self-insurance plan. Accordingly, states considering elective workers’
compensation should subject non-subscribers to the same financial
analysis and collateral requirements that they apply to self-insurers. Such
requirements would likely preclude a large number of small employers
from opting out, but they would ensure that those that are able to opt out
are able to pay the negligence claims that ultimately arise.
202

See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033 (West 2009) (listing the defenses that are
unavailable to employers).
203
EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008, supra note 97, at 24.
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See supra Part III (discussing workers’ compensation risk financing options).
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See supra Part III.
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See supra Part III.
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Some would argue that the smallest employers, who are presently
exempt from the workers’ compensation system not only in Texas, but
also in several other states,207 should continue to be treated differently.
The argument for this is that small employers, especially start-ups, often
cannot afford large overhead expenses like a workers’ compensation
policy, and they should be allowed to forgo this until they reach a critical
mass of employees.208 While the premise that small businesses sometimes
need extra help may be true, any such support should not be subsidized, as
a matter of policy, by the injured worker or by the taxpayer when the
worker exhausts his resources.
B. Exchanging a Waiver for Occupational Injury Benefits
As discussed supra in Part II, among non-subscribing employers only
a relatively small percentage pay medical (23 percent)209 and lost wage
expenses (20 percent) for the entire duration of the employee’s injury.210
Thus, the remainder of non-subscribers that pay occupational injury
benefits essentially receive waivers of negligence claims or agreements to
arbitrate211 in exchange for benefits that are inferior to those provided
under the workers’ compensation system. As noted above, this is an
exceedingly difficult problem for a state to solve directly because it is
preempted by ERISA from regulating the benefit plan and by the FAA
from regulating the contents of arbitration agreements.212 However,
assuming a solution is found to the FAA preemption dilemma that would
prevent employers from directly conditioning employment on acceptance
of an arbitration and waiver agreement,213 the fact that the benefits traded
for are inferior to those provided by workers’ compensation does not
mean that such agreements would be either implicitly unfair or beyond the
reach of the legislature. As long as an employer cannot condition employment on the execution of an arbitration agreement, the employee
retains the power to forgo the occupational injury benefits offered by
207

EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008, supra note 97, at 2.
Id. at 3.
209
See supra Part II.B.
210
See supra Part II.B.
211
See supra Part II.C.
212
See supra Part II.C.
213
See supra Part II.C. Concededly, states will be powerless to regulate the fairness
of the benefit programs because such concessions are “traded” for without first obtaining
a change to the FAA that would preclude preemption of statutory non-waiver provisions
in the states’ labor and employment statutes.
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refusing to sign the waiver or arbitration agreement. Such an employee
would rely instead on the negligence remedy.
An informed employee’s decision about whether to agree to this trade
will depend on two factors: the generosity of the benefit plan and the
employee’s likelihood of prevailing in negligence claims. Thus, the
legislature in a state with elective workers’ compensation could indirectly
regulate the contents of occupational injury plans by liberalizing or
constricting the negligence remedy. If, for example, employers are
providing skimpy benefits across the board, the legislature could respond
by tweaking the employer’s liability statute to make recovery by plaintiffs
more likely. Granting employees beefed up litigation power would
indirectly induce employers to provide richer benefits in order to secure
waivers of this power. This, of course, assumes informed employees. The
extent to which employees are or can become informed about their rights
to refuse to sign waivers or arbitration agreements is an empirical matter
beyond the scope of this Note. This Note assumes that it would be
possible, through the plaintiff’s bar, public service campaigns, and other
means to make employees aware of their rights.
While it is possible to see how this could work, the problem of the
burden of unpaid claims remains. The majority of Texas non-subscribers
did not cover medical expenses or lost wages for the entire duration of the
injury.214 This means that claimants with injuries that outlast the
durational or dollar limits of the employer’s benefit plan will carry the
burden of funding their continued medical care and lost wages. Informed
employees should be capable of assessing this risk when determining
whether to trade their rights to negligence claims. Furthermore, they
should be capable of funding this risk through personal disability
insurance. Thus, as long as two key conditions exist, namely a credible
threat of successful negligence litigation and an informed workforce, this
trade will be fair in most cases.
V. THE REAL BENEFIT OF ELECTIVE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
As noted above, there are fairly serious problems with the Texas
elective workers’ compensation system. This Note has addressed potential
solutions to some of these problems, but the question remains: why should
a state move to an elective system that, outside of Texas, no other state has
adopted? The answer to this question lies in the 23 percent and 20 percent
214

See supra Part II.B.
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respectively of Texas non-subscribers that do pay medical expenses and
wage replacement expenses for the entire duration of their employees’
injuries.215 These employers provide employees with substantially the
same benefits as they would receive under workers’ compensation, and
yet, they presumably do so at a lower cost.216 Benefits are strictly
regulated for employers who opt into workers’ compensation, but those
who opt out have the opportunity to innovate and come up with ways to
provide substantially the same benefits for less money. This innovation
allows these employers to compete more effectively and could, down the
road, lead to cost reductions even for opt in employers when the
innovative ideas become adopted by the regulators.
CONCLUSION
Texas’s elective workers’ compensation system, while not ready for
off the shelf roll-out to other states, does provide a blueprint for a system
other states could adopt to foster innovation and cost reduction in their
workers’ compensation systems. States considering elective workers’
compensation systems would do well to start with Texas’s basic
framework, with the following changes.
First and foremost, states considering elective workers’ compensation
would need to achieve a solution to the FAA preemption dilemma, most
likely through lobbying for a change to the FAA to constrict the FAA's
preemption of employment related non-waiver provisions. This would
allow states to prevent employers from extracting pre-injury waivers from
their employees. This is critical because if an employer can secure waivers
from its employees before injuries, it can effectively neutralize the threat
of negligence suits. It can thus secure the principal benefit of a workers’
compensation system, namely near immunity from employer’s liability
lawsuits, while at the same time providing stingy or no benefits to the
employees in return.
Second, states that do move forward with elective workers’
compensation should require the same financial review and collateral
requirements from non-subscribers as they do from self-insurers. This
would ensure that workers who were injured through the negligence of
their employers could count on their employers to have the financial
215

See supra Part II.B.
This Note makes this assumption on the following basis: an employer who could
pay workers' compensation benefits for less than the cost of an alternative benefits plan
would certainly do so because it would gain the additional benefit of being absolved from
unpredictable negligence litigation.
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wherewithal to make them whole. Such requirements would be likely to
preclude a large number of small employers from opting out, but they
would ensure that those who are able to opt out are able to pay the
negligence claims that ultimately arise. Subscribers already guarantee their
ability to pay claims either through their insurance companies or through
collateral. There is no good reason that non-subscribers should be exempt
from such a requirement.
Third, states considering elective workers’ compensation should
consider liberalization of the negligence remedy, at least to the extent
Texas already has in eliminating the common law defenses of assumption
of risk, contributory negligence, and negligence of a fellow employee.
This will encourage non-subscribers to offer generous occupational injury
benefits in exchange for waivers or arbitration agreements.
Finally, states considering elective workers’ compensation should ensure that employees of non-subscribers are on the same footing as
employees of subscribers with respect to retaliatory discrimination and
discharge. Without protection from retaliation, employers could deter use
of their benefit programs by taking adverse employment actions against
employees that have availed themselves of their benefits.
Adopting an elective workers’ compensation system, with these
modifications, is likely to foster innovation and cost reduction in the field
of occupational injuries. Employers would be empowered to develop
occupational injury benefit plans that are both sufficiently generous as to
make it worthwhile for their employees to trade their right to negligence
claims for these plans and less costly because of a reduced need to comply
with workers’ compensation regulations. The cost savings employers
could create would result in a competitive advantage for a state's
employers and for the state itself in attracting employers.
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